Alleviating the lagging performance of economically depressed communities and regions by Timothy Bates
Lagging economic base, lagging employment and incomes: Roots
Joseph Schumpeter observed in the early 20th century that there really is
no equilibrium in competitive markets. Static efficiency at one point in
time conveys little advantage to the firm, the industry, the region; the
advantage, instead, belongs to the innovators introducing new marketing
strategies, new products, more efficient production techniques. The
entrenched giants relying upon scale economies in production and market-
ing for competitive advantage are unlikely to survive in the long run, when
matched against the entrepreneurs who invent new market segments, revo-
lutionize production techniques, and reconfigure supply chains.
Many of the greatest centers of industry in the 20th century United States
are economically depressed areas today—Detroit, Mich; Gary, Ind.; and
various cities in upstate New York, among others. All suffer from a slow,
long-term loss of competitive position. Leading firms in the these regions—
Ford, U. S. Steel, Kodak, Xerox, and others—previously enjoyed powerful
oligopolistic positions in their respective industries.
The process of decay did not follow a set formula, but Michael Porter has
identified certain broad patterns—lagging innovation, a gentlemanly pace of
competition, a tendency to blame industry problems on unfair international
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1competition, or, perhaps, labor unions (1990). Competition, once suppressed
by private-sector monopoly power, might be suppressed partially by protec-
tive government policies once the process of decline has set in. But this, at
best, merely slows the pace of decline. 
Local governments in the declining regions often face fiscal crises, to
which they adapt by pursuing policies that accelerate the pace of decline. In
Detroit, for example, weak infrastructure and poor education and training
systems work to exacerbate rather than alleviate the processes of long-term
decline. Bright, ambitious young adults raised in economically depressed
areas often choose to depart, seeking their fortunes in other regions of the
country, where opportunities are wider and risks are lower. The outcomes
of these and other contributing factors are economically depressed regions
characterized by weak human resources, low levels of capital investment,
lagging innovation, and eroding infrastructure. Something of a downward
spiral develops; a process of cumulative causation takes root, which is very
hard to halt, much less reverse.
Porter offers a provocative thumbnail sketch of what is perhaps the most
common cause of regional stagnation, the core cause of high underemploy-
ment rates and lagging household incomes. Firms constituting the economic
base of the area—the firms that bring in dollars by selling their products to
clients located outside of the region—are experiencing a loss of their competi-
tive edge (1990). These established firms may have large-scale, highly
specialized assets in the form of plants and equipment; their professional, tech-
nical, managerial staff—indeed most of their workers—may possess a wealth of
specialized skills and hands-on work experience. That is not really the crux of
the problem. The crux is the fact that these established firms, however wealthy
and powerful, have been slow to adapt to changing circumstances.
This fact is why the large and powerful corporation so often loses out
when faced with competition that is truly entrepreneurial. “Successful
companies seek predictability and stability,” notes Porter (1990, p. 52). All
too often, a conventional wisdom prevails that is rooted in circumstances
that are losing their relevance. Faced with competitive threats rooted in
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 changing circumstances, decisions are based upon strategies rooted in the
past: “Strategy becomes ossified” (Porter, 1990, p. 52).
Entrepreneurship may manifest itself in many ways, and I will focus
primarily upon one of them: small firms. What chance does the small busi-
ness have against the entrenched, large-scale, status quo producers? The
inflexibility of the old order is the key to understanding why the newcomer
often prevails. Not encumbered by the conventional wisdom, the entrepre-
neurial newcomer is not bound by prevailing norms and practices. Greater
flexibility, quicker execution, new strategies—these are the keys to success.
The dynamics of regional cumulative underdevelopment
Declining competitive advantage drags down the economic-base indus-
tries that regions rely upon for competitive advantage. If the regional
economy is highly diversified, cumulative underdevelopment tendencies
may never materialize. A healthy, well-diversified regional economy is one
that most likely has a number of different industries experiencing varying
stages of expansion and decline. As those core industries experiencing
declining competitiveness free up resources (for example, by laying off
workers), those enjoying increasing competitiveness and expanding market
share are buying/hiring more resources. This process undoubtedly is painful
to individuals displaced from a declining sector and lacking the skills most
actively sought in the expanding sectors. Yet, this pain of transition is part
of the normal functioning of a healthy, market-driven capitalist economy.
The problem of cumulative underdevelopment is profoundly more painful,
and it most often afflicts areas having a thinly diversified economic base.
A hypothetical depressed area is described in this section, focusing upon
parameters that perpetuate regional underdevelopment. I am not attempt-
ing to deny the diversity that characterizes actual depressed regions and
districts. My intent, rather, is to simplify reality by abstracting from messy
detail, highlighting, instead, certain core traits that might be manipulated
by persons or institutions seeking to create or expand entrepreneur-driven
business activities.
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dynamic economy. Economic underdevelopment is preserved by a drain of
resources that keeps the area depressed. Flows of resources interact with
prevailing economic conditions in a system of circular causation that main-
tains underdeveloped areas as characteristic features of the U.S. economy.
Applicable resource drains include human capital, financial capital, physical
capital, and purchasing power. Depressed areas, thus, are left without many
of the resources needed for their redevelopment and improvement. 
Human capital is the most important single resource. This resource often
departs over time by way of the educational system and the high-wage
economy. Drawn by outside opportunities, many intelligent and capable
young adults move into the progressive sectors where opportunities are
wider and rewards are greater. Advanced educational credentials acquired at
colleges and universities are common tickets out for bright young people.
Attractive career opportunities are forthcoming from employers located in
prosperous, growing regions of the country. Depressed-area employers are
unlikely to offer comparable opportunities. This selective drain of human
resources leaves underdeveloped areas without many of their best products.
Young people may be the most mobile, but they are not the only human
resources departing from depressed areas. Declining opportunities encour-
age local professionals to look elsewhere. The pull of attractive career
options in expanding regions, combined with the push of bleak local
options, cause accountants, engineers, lawyers, doctors, and various other
professionals to depart. They often are not replaced.
The drain of physical capital is equally striking. The economic-base indus-
tries in depressed areas are typically in decline. Regions with atrophying
export industries—autos in Detroit, camera film in Rochester, dairy prod-
ucts in rural New England—make up a major share of the depressed areas
currently found in the United States. Almost by definition, declining export
industries are undergoing long-term disinvestment. New investment—
particularly cost-cutting investment—may take place, and the economic
-base industries indeed may be major local employers. But long-run trends
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 are clear: Employment numbers are gradually declining; old facilities close
down, rarely to be replaced. Factories, farms, and other facilities often fall
into a state of underutilization and ultimate abandonment.
Nonbase industries—local retailing and services—gain much of their
vitality (or lack thereof) from the area’s economic-base industries. When
factories close and farm land is underutilized, employment in the base
industries falls predictably, and the pool of local purchasing power available
to buy the goods and services of the nonbase industries contracts. Nonbase
industries, therefore, shrink in lock-step fashion as the region’s economic
base declines.
Faced with declining industries, job loss, shrinking purchasing power, and
selective out-migration of well-educated adults, local governments operate in
an environment of declining fiscal capacity. The local public infrastructure,
therefore, may be updated rarely. This aging infrastructure becomes increas-
ingly expensive to maintain. Lacking the resources for adequate maintenance
and repair, local governments often permit public facilities to deteriorate.
Streets, schools, parks, sanitation, police and fire stations (and their equip-
ment) simply depreciate. Repairs focus upon crisis management rather than
normal maintenance; resulting deterioration and disinvestment is the process
whereby physical capital in the form of public infrastructure literally drains
out of depressed areas. Ultimately, older schools, libraries, police and fire
stations, hospitals, and the like are closed down.
The housing sector’s vitality is profoundly symptomatic of dominant
trends in the region’s private sector. Low property values and a paucity of
new construction predictably accompany the long-run decline of the local
economic base. Weak public services provided by local governments that
are prone to fiscal crisis do not enhance property values. Faced with a
declining demand for rental housing, some landlords may choose to main-
tain their short-run cash flows by minimizing building maintenance. Like
the public infrastructure, portions of the rental housing stock fall into a
pattern of deterioration and disinvestment. When property is worn out and
future prospects do not warrant major repairs, it is abandoned. 
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 A substantial part of the savings generated by residents and businesses in
depressed areas flows into local financial institutions whose investment poli-
cies may drain funds out of the area. A modern financial sector normally
stimulates growth by mobilizing savings and by facilitating allocation of
funds to finance economic activity. Businesses, households, and local
governments each depend upon such funds to finance economic activities
beyond those supportable by their current internal capacity to raise funds.
Yet in economies where regional development is highly uneven, expansion
in growing areas typically drains capital from declining regions (Bates and
Bradford, 1979).                                                          
High rates of investment in expanding areas increase employment and
purchasing power, and this, in turn, further tends to increase investment in
a multiplier fashion. To support high investment, funds migrate to the
growing areas from other regions, in search of attractive returns. “The
banking system,” observed Myrdal, “becomes an instrument for siphoning
off the savings from the poorer regions to the richer and more progressive
ones” (1957, p. 28). 
The resources that might enable a depressed area to break out of its down-
ward trajectory are precisely the resources that are prone to drain out.
Bankers seek secure returns; young adults seek attractive career opportuni-
ties; landlords redeploy their capital by disinvesting from weak housing
markets. All of these processes are part of the normal functioning of the
U.S. economy. That is precisely why depressed areas are normal features of
a dynamic economy.
Redeploying resources from declining to expanding sectors and regions
often exacerbates uneven development because processes of circular causation
magnify growth in the expanding areas and decline in the depressed regions.
By way of summary, the capital and talent needed to revitalize depressed areas
tend to be drained away. As these resources gravitate toward high-growth
areas, regional inequality is heightened. As the ensuing downward multiplier
process becomes entrenched, it can be quite difficult to reverse. Local govern-
ments are particularly harmed: Declining resources predictably lead to public
infrastructure decay and a struggle to maintain public services. Housing
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 markets, already hurt by out-migration, suffer further from declining services
and amenities forthcoming from the public sector. Banks, observing local
government deterioration and a weak housing market, are reinforced in their
belief that secure returns on loans are more attainable elsewhere. Tightening
credit availability encourages landlords to disinvest from marginal properties
that otherwise might have been maintained. 
Pessimism reigns, further encouraging young adults to pursue careers in
more promising environs. Nonbase industries are unlikely to make long-term
investments in local retail and service industries. Out-migration, public-sector
deterioration, tightening credit availability, housing disinvestment, business
disinvestment…all of these factors tend to snowball; decline feeds upon
decline in a process of circular causation.
Orthodox attempts to revitalize depressed areas
An important realization is that systematic local government responses to
economic decline are often themselves contributors to further economic
deterioration. Simply stated, entrenched government policies worsen the
situation in many instances, constituting an effective strategy for undermin-
ing possibilities for economic revitalization. This may stem from structural
problems—loss of property-tax base, for example—rather than incompe-
tence or mismanagement in local government. Incompetence, of course,
merely causes a bad situation to worsen (Porter, 1997).
Lack of political power may handicap local governments as they compete
for resources at higher levels of government. Infrastructure improvement, for
example, may be needed badly, but the competition for public-sector infra-
structure allocations may be intense. Winners are apt to be the contenders
with greater political clout: Affluent suburbs may take the bulk of infrastruc-
ture funding that fiscally strapped central cities seek (Orfield, 1997). 
There exists, nonetheless, a group of public policies, identified as “local
economic development policies,” designed to promote business investment
and job creation in regions and communities characterized as low-
income/high-poverty, high-unemployment and -underemployment, and
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 the like. Such policies often evolve in a political environment in which the
major development needs of depressed areas do not shape heavily the
content of the remedial depressed-area-revitalization program.
Enterprise zones, of course, come to mind. Tax subsidy schemes designed
to jump-start economically depressed areas have been a standard feature of
local economic development policies for decades. Numerous studies by
economists have produced little hard evidence that such tax cut policies
actually achieve their objectives in any fashion, much less in a cost-effective
manner. But there is some. A recent review of the scholarly literature on
applicable state tax incentives, conducted by Terry Buss, does find some
evidence of tax breaks actually influencing firm location decisions (2001). 
The narrower scholarly literature on enterprise and empowerment zones
has reached a similar stage of development (Peters and Fisher, 2002). Well-
designed studies of impact (Dowell, 1996, for example) usually conclude
that enterprise-zone incentives have no discernible impact whatsoever upon
the location, investment, and job creation decisions of private businesses.
But a serious optimist could find enough evidence fragments in the existing
literature to argue that a program characterized by superior design and
excellent administration may be a useful tool for revitalizing depressed areas.
Such optimism might explain why the city of Detroit has been blanketed
by a variety of state and federal enterprise/empowerment-zone incentives
and programs over the past decade. An alternative hypothesis is that adopt-
ing tax incentives is politically easier and less expensive than addressing
major infrastructure needs, lack of local government fiscal capacity, and
other serious structural problems that undermine the attractiveness of
Detroit as a site for business creation and expansion. This hypothesis, which
I label the “tax incentive as a token gesture” hypothesis, is a productive area
for further scholarly research. Meanwhile, prevailing informed opinion
suggests that tax incentive schemes are likely to have little impact by them-
selves in either revitalizing depressed areas or encouraging critically needed
entrepreneurial business development. 
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 The case for public-sector involvement in worker training/retraining is
altogether different than the rationale for boosting local economic develop-
ment through tax subsidies. Yet, the worker training strategy, properly
understood, is not really about area development. Local economic develop-
ment strategies are often characterized as “place based.” Worker training
and education, in contrast, are “people based” and, thus, at best, a very indi-
rect approach to revitalizing depressed areas.
Seen in the context of a dynamic, ever-changing economy, the need to
encourage, subsidize, and otherwise provide for worker training and retrain-
ing is widely recognized and not controversial. As workers predictably are
expelled from sectors of industry where labor demand is declining, effective
retraining facilitates transfer of workers into sectors where labor demand is
increasing. Workers need to have the skills and expertise that are being
sought by employers in expanding sectors in a dynamic economy. Effective
training heightens the mobility of displaced workers and lowers the personal
costs of transition borne by workers who have lost their jobs.
The fallacy of utilizing education and training as a place-based redevelop-
ment strategy has been demonstrated many times (Fusfeld and Bates,
1984). Effective training (like education) increases one’s options in the
labor market; it enhances one’s mobility. That mobility can move a worker
from a declining industry to an expanding one. Another aspect of facilitat-
ing job mobility is the fact that the greater mobility also can draw people
out of the stagnant and declining geographic areas, where jobs are few, and
into the dynamic and expanding geographic areas, where opportunities are
readily available. People move to opportunity. The depressed areas that the
mobile members of the workforce leave behind reap no automatic benefit.
Having lost their more skilled and mobile workers, these areas most often
find that they are positively worse off. The cumulative causation heighten-
ing regional inequality is unlikely to be abated through worker training and
education efforts.
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 What does work?
The conditions that enhance regional inequality are counterbalanced, in
the private sector, by forces inherent in that inequality. This counterbalanc-
ing is highly imperfect and may not be apparent for many years, but it is a
type of corrective process that attracts observant entrepreneurs. Simply
stated, sustained growth in specific geographic areas tends to increase the
costs of doing business. Silicon Valley grew rapidly for decades; costs of
doing business, by the end of the 20th century, had soared. Housing was
brutally expensive, infrastructure was congested, skilled labor was increas-
ingly scarce and aggressively sought. Sustained success, at some point, tends
to turn into its opposite.
Sustained underperformance has altogether different private-sector mani-
festations. Property values stagnate and decline; plants and equipment are
widely underutilized; idle land awaits development and redevelopment;
underemployment is often rampant in the local labor pool. Economic stag-
nation itself naturally generates a pool of resources that is ready and willing
to be redeployed.
What is needed is an individual who profitably can redeploy the underuti-
lized resources of the depressed region. This is the role of the entrepreneur.
His/her further role is to attract the necessary resources from outside the
region that, when combined with local resources, will translate it into a viable
business entity. 
The appropriate role of government, broadly, is not to give this entrepre-
neur a tax subsidy. More importantly, depressed-area local governments
need to be taken out of the fiscal straightjacket that too often undermines
their ability to provide modern infrastructure and basic government serv-
ices. A local government lacking the fiscal capacity and/or ability to provide
modern infrastructure and basic services will drive away far more entrepre-
neurs than an enterprise zone will attract.
Detroit in 1994 was implementing a federally funded empowerment-zone
program to complement its existing enterprise-zone incentives to businesses.
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 Simultaneously, the city’s once-impressive system of freeways literally was
falling apart; local streets were in serious disrepair; large parts of the sewer and
water main infrastructure were decades beyond their useful life; snow removal
from most of Detroit’s streets ranged from problematic to nonexistent. This
list of basic systemic malfunctions is illustrative rather than exhaustive.
Contemplate building a new firm in an enterprise zone and tapping into a
section of the sewer system that was installed during the Civil War: The enter-
prise-zone incentives were not attractive. Detroit, on balance, was operating a
disinvestment program: Its public-sector characteristics (zone incentives
included) were driving firms away. Entrepreneurs who might redeploy the
underutilized labor and capital resources were driven away.
Detroit claimed that it was offering economic revitalization incentives to
private businesses, but, on balance, it wasn’t. The net effect of the incentive,
infrastructure, and government services package in Detroit was to enhance
underdevelopment. The city was operating an economic devitalization
program. It worked: Detroit’s economic base was weaker in 2005, and the
number of workers employed by the private sector had fallen, relative to
early-1990s levels. The attraction of underutilized resources has been effec-
tively neutralized, in the eyes of private-sector firms, by the economic
devitalization program put forth by the public sector.
What is to be done?
This is a conceptual paper. Thus far, I have been discussing the positive
contribution of entrepreneurship to area revitalization in a highly general,
abstract manner. The balance of this paper will move from the abstract to
the specific end of the analytical spectrum. I will narrow my focus to one
specific manifestation of entrepreneurship—the small business. 
Economic-base industries (those selling products outside of the region)
commonly have been thought of as goods producers predominantly—
producers of manufactured goods and bulk commodities as diverse as coal,
soybeans, and apples. Aside from agricultural producers, goods production
industries have been dominated traditionally by large firms. 
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 The role of small firms in base and nonbase industries can be clarified by
imperfectly grouping a region’s firms into three broad categories. First, the
base industries serving multistate, national, and international markets provide
the raison d’être for the regional economy—autos in Detroit, dairy products
in rural Vermont, movies in Los Angeles. A second industry tier complements
the base industries by providing them with the goods and services used to
produce their exported products. A third industry tier supplies the local
economy with food, housing, medical services, recreational services, and the
like. This third group is dominated by small businesses. Tier two has a signif-
icant presence of larger-scale small firms, but it is predominantly populated
by large businesses. Tier one, finally, is dominated by large-scale firms, partic-
ularly the Fortune 500-type of giant corporations.
Area revitalization is accomplished most directly by strengthening a
region’s economic base, that is to say, by strengthening the scope and pres-
ence of tier-one and tier-two firms. If these firms prosper, money flows into
the region from the purchases of customers located elsewhere. As the
economic-base employers hire more workers and buy more products from
local suppliers, benefits filter down to tier-three firms in a multiplier
fashion. A tempting generalization is that the big firms (tiers one and two)
lead, and the small firms (tier three) follow. The more accurate this gener-
alization, the weaker the potential contribution of small firms to revitalizing
the economy in depressed areas.
Tier-one firms in many of the nation’s regions with lagging economies are
lagging because of rising competition rooted in the rapid globalization of
goods production. Southern textile mills lose market share, and the regions
where they predominate find themselves facing the same types of problems
that have set back the Detroit area: Decline in the base industries ripples
through the region in a multiplier fashion. In this context, the development
potential of tier-three small businesses is likely to be neutralized by declin-
ing local purchasing power. Entrepreneurial innovation is needed at tiers
one and two.
Can an innovative small business in textiles revitalize the local economic
base in a declining textile-dominated region? Perhaps it can. Consider the case
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 for pessimism. Hopelessness and despair among local economic development
advocates are most justified when six conditions apply; the applicable six
conditions broadly define industry niches where significant scale economies
permit high-volume mass production of goods that are amenable to being
moved cheaply via containerized shipping. If the following six questions are
answered affirmatively, the odds against the success of the innovative small
producer of goods are overwhelming:
1. Is the market for the product large?
2. Is the product standardized?
3. Is the demand for the product highly stable?
4. Is speed of delivery of only minor importance?
5. Is the product’s weight/bulk-to-value ratio low?
6. Do the dominant producers of this product exercise significant 
monopolistic power in their dealings with major suppliers?
Global supply chains have come to dominate in many product areas
where the above conditions apply. Why produce bath towels in North
Carolina? Produce them, instead, in a large, modern factory in southern
China, where wage and benefit costs are a fraction of those prevailing in
North Carolina. 
Traditional advice that economists offer to innovative firms seeking to
gain bath-towel competitiveness strikes me as rather useless. Conventional
advice for producers unable to compete on labor costs has been to 1) invest
in labor-saving equipment and 2) reorganize production and training for the
purpose of making labor more productive. Concerted efforts to step up
capital investment and worker productivity have been widespread responses
to labor-cost disadvantages. For over two decades, this strategy has been
undermined broadly because a steadily growing number of export-oriented
producers in low-wage countries have matched “the levels of productivity
attained by the most efficient domestic producers” (Waldinger, 1989, p. 72).
The globe is becoming a steadily smaller place as far as goods produc-
tion is concerned. Sophisticated telecommunications along with jumbo
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 jets and containerized shipping effectively have shrunk international
space. Productivity levels of U.S. workers are increasingly matched or
even exceeded in a growing range of producers utilizing low-cost labor in
countries like China. 
By specifying the case for pessimism, I simultaneously have spelled out
the converse—the circumstances in which the innovative small firm can
compete successfully at tier one. Inherent in every advantage of the global
low-cost producer is an important disadvantage. International space has
shrunk, but the producer at the endpoint of a 10,000-mile-long global
supply chain still lacks much of the flexibility that provides viable market
niches for innovative small firms.
The giant factories in Asia may enjoy significant scale economies in
production, but those producers are unlikely to be competitive in market
niches demanding rapid deliveries of small, unstandardized orders. The
weight-to-value ratios of many products rule out economical shipping by air
freight; a very long supply chain, therefore, translates into a very long time
lag. Domestically as well as globally, the flexible, quick-moving small
producer has an edge in serving niche markets, particularly those character-
ized by unstable demand and small average order size. Is the applicable
niche market subject to regularly changing consumer tastes and preferences?
Is the product market seasonal in ways that are hard to predict? Does the
niche market deal in perishable products, particularly products where fresh-
ness and price are directly related? Broadly speaking, an affluent clientele
often prefers the niche product to the standardized, mass-produced alterna-
tive. This reality gives the innovative, flexible, fast-moving small firm entry
into tier one; this type of small business indeed can be a major component
of the goods-producing industries that so often dominate a region’s
economic base.
If the following six questions (or most of them) are answered affirma-
tively, the odds favoring the success of innovative small producers of goods
are very positive:
1. Is the market for the product small?
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 2. Is the product highly differentiated (as opposed to standardized)?
3. Is the demand for the product highly viable?
4. Is speed of delivery of major importance?
5. Is the product’s weight/bulk-to-value ratio high?
6. Are the applicable supplier industries highly competitive?
If the above conditions apply, then the wisdom of Joseph Schumpeter is
highly applicable: Static efficiency at one point in time conveys little advan-
tage…the advantage, instead, belongs to the innovators introducing new
marketing strategies and new products; cost advantages rooted in low wages
and scale economies of production convey little advantage to the export-
based manufacturer in a wide range of the markets served by innovative
entrepreneurs operating nimble small businesses. 
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